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Usable security and privacy research began more than 15 years ago. In 1999, Alma Whitten and J.D. Tygar 
explained “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt,”1 and Anne Adams and I pleaded that, even though they don’t 
always comply with security policies, “Users Are Not the Enemy.2 Today, there are several specialist 
conferences and workshops: publications on usability security and privacy are featured in top usability 
conferences, such as ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI), and top 
security conferences, such as the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.  
An ongoing topic in usable security research is security warnings. Security experts despair that the vast 
majority of users ignore warnings—they just “swat” them, just as they do with most dialog boxes. Over the 
past six years, continuous efforts have focused on changing this behavior and getting users to pay more 
attention. SSL certificate warnings are a key example: all browser providers have evolved their warnings in 
an attempt to get users to take them more seriously. For instance, Mozilla Firefox increased the number of 
dialog boxes and clicks users must wade through to proceed with the connection, even though it might not 
be secure. However, this has made little difference to the many users who decide to ignore the warnings 
and proceed. But creating more elaborate warnings to guide users towards secure behavior is not 
necessarily the best course of action, as it doesn’t align with the principles of user-centered design. 
Refining Warnings 
At ACM CHI 2015, two studies reported on efforts to make more users heed warnings. Adrienne Porter 
Felt and her colleagues at Google designed a new SSL warning for Google Chrome, applying 
recommendations from current usable security research: keep warnings brief, use simple language to 
describe the specific risk, and illustrate the potential consequences of proceeding.3 The authors 
hypothesized that if users understand the risks associated with a warning, they will heed rather than ignore 
it.  
They tested these improved warnings in a series of mini surveys and found a modest but significant (12 
percent) improvement in the number of participants who correctly identified the potential risks of 
proceeding, but no significant improvement in the number of participants who correctly identified the data 
at risk. In addition, compared to existing browser SSL warnings, there was no improvement in the number 
of participants who thought the warning was likely to be a false positive.  
Felt and her colleagues reasoned that if they couldn’t improve users’ understanding, they might still be 
able to guide users toward secure choices. They applied what they called opinionated design to make it 
harder for participants to circumvent warnings, and visual design techniques to make the secure course of 
action look more attractive. In a field study, this technique led to a 30 percent increase in the number of 
participants who didn’t proceed upon seeing the warning. The authors concluded that it’s difficult to 
improve user comprehension of online risks with simple, brief, nontechnical, and specific warnings, yet 
they urge fellow researchers to keep trying to develop such warnings. In the meantime, they advise 
designers to use opinionated design to deter users from proceeding in the face of warnings by making them 
harder to circumvent and emphasizing the risks associated with doing so.  
In the second paper, Bonnie Anderson and her colleagues examined 25 participants’ brain responses to 
warnings using a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner.4 Previous studies using eye 
tracking showed that users habituate: the first time around, a warning catches their attention, but after 
repeated showings, it does not. Anderson and her colleagues found that the brain mirrors this habituation: 
when encountering a warning for the first time, participants’ visual processing center in the superior 
parietal lobes showed elevated activation levels, but these disappeared with repeated showings of the 
warning.  
The authors hypothesized that varying a warning’s appearance, such as its size, color, and text ordering, 
should prevent habituation and keep participants paying attention. They found that participants indeed 
showed sustained activation levels when encountering these polymorphic warnings; participants’ attention 
only decreased on average after the 13th variation of the same warning. They concluded that users can’t 
help but habituate, and designers should combat this by creating warnings that force users to pay attention. 
Usability: when does ‘guiding’ become ‘bullying’? 
Both teams’ work was motivated by an honorable intention—to help users choose the secure option. But as 
a security researcher with a usability background and many years of studying user behavior in the lab as 
well as in real-world settings, I am concerned by the suggestion that we should use design techniques to 
force users to keep paying attention and push them toward what we deem the secure—and hence better—
option. It is a paternalistic, technology-centered perspective that assumes the security experts’ solution is 
the correct way to manage a specific threat.  
In the case of SSL, the authors recommended counteracting people’s habituation response and keeping 
their attention focused on security. However, habituation is an evolved response that increases human 
efficiency in day-to-day interactions with the environment: we stop paying attention to signals we’ve 
deemed irrelevant. Crying wolf too often leads to alarm or alert fatigue; this has been demonstrated over 
many decades in industries such as construction and mining and, most recently, with the rapid increase of 
monitoring equipment in hospitals.  
In 2013, the US Joint Commission issued an alert about the widespread phenomenon of alarm fatigue.5 
The main problem was desensitization to alarms, which led to staff missing critical events. An increase in 
workload and decrease in patient satisfaction were also noted.  
Eminent software engineer and usability expert Alan Cooper identified the use of warnings in software 
as a problem more than a decade ago.6 He pointed out that warnings should be reserved for genuine 
exceptions—events software developers couldn’t reasonably anticipate and make provisions for. Perhaps 
on their legal advisors’ suggestion, most developers have ignored Cooper’s recommendation, and the 
increasing need for security has led to a marked further increase in the number of dialogue boxes or 
warnings that user have to ‘swat’ today.  
Strategies such as opinionated design and forcibly attracting users’ attention disrupt user activities is not 
usability. As Cooper pointed out, usability’s overall guiding principle is to support users in reaching their 
primary goals as efficiently as possible. Security that routinely diverts the attention and disrupts the 
activities of users in pursuit of these goals is the thus the antithesis of a user-centered approach.  
And where, in practical terms, would this approach lead us? A colleague with whom I discussed the 
studies commented: “Even with this polymorphic approach, users stop paying attention after 13 warning 
messages. I suppose the next step is to administer significant electrical shocks to users as they receive the 
warning messages, so that they are literally jolted into paying attention.” (The colleague kindly allowed me 
to use the quote, but wishes to remain anonymous.) Scaring, tricking, and bullying users into secure 
behaviors is not usable security.  
Cost versus Benefit 
In 2009, Turing award and von Neumann medal winner Butler Lampson pointed out that7  
[t]hings are so bad for usable security that we need to give up on perfection and focus on essentials. The root 
cause of the problem is economics: we don’t know the costs either of getting security or of not having it, so users 
quite rationally don’t care much about it. … To fix this we need to measure the cost of security, and especially 
the time users spend on it. 
Lampson’s observations haven’t been heeded. User time and effort are rarely at the forefront of usable 
security studies; the focus is on whether users choose the behavior that researchers claim to be desirable 
because it’s more secure. Even if users’ interaction time with specific security mechanisms, such as a 
longer password, is measured, the cumulative longer-term effect of draining time from individual and 
organizational productivity isn’t considered.  
Over the past few years, researchers have declared the task of recalling and entering 15- or 20-character 
complex passwords ‘usable’ because participants in Mechanical Turk studies were able to do so. But being 
able to do something a couple of times in the artificial constraints of such studies doesn’t mean the vast 
majority users could—or would want to—do so regularly in pursuit of their everyday goals. 
Factors such as fatigue as well as habituation affect performance. In real-world environments, 
authentication fatigue isn’t hard to detect: users reorganize their primary tasks to minimize exposure to 
secondary security tasks, stop using devices and services with onerous security, and don’t pursue 
innovative ideas because they can’t face any more “battles with security” that they anticipate on the path to 
realizing those ideas.8 It’s been disheartening to see that, in many organizations, users who circumvent 
security measures to remain productive are still seen as the root of the problem—“the enemy”2—and that 
the answer is to educate or threaten them into behavior security experts demand – rather than considering 
the possibility that security needs to be re-designed.  
A good example is the currently popular notion that sending phishing messages to a company’s 
employees, and directing them to pages about the dangers of clicking links, is a good way to get their 
attention and make them less likely to click in the future. Telling employees not to click on links can work 
in businesses in which there’s no need to click embedded links. But if legitimate business tasks contain 
embedded links, employees can’t examine and ponder every time they encounter a link without 
compromising productivity.  
In addition, being tricked by a company’s own security staff is a negative, adversarial experience that 
undermines the trust relationship between the organization and employees. Security experts who aim to 
make security work by “fixing” human shortcomings are ignoring key lessons from human factors and 
economics.  
In modern, busy work environments, users will continue to circumvent security tasks that have a high 
workload and disrupt primary activities because they substantially decrease productivity. No amount of 
security education—a further distraction from primary tasks—will change that. Rather, any security 
measure should pass a cost–benefit test: Is it easy and quick to do, and does it offer a good level protection?  
Cormac Herley calculated that the economic cost of the time users spend on standard security measures 
such as passwords, antiphishing tools, and certificate warnings is billions of dollars in the US alone—and 
this when the security benefits of complying with the security advice are dubious.9 SSL warnings have 
overwhelming false-positive rate—close to 100 percent for many years9—so users developed alarm fatigue 
and learned to ignore them. In addition, longer (12- to 15-character) passwords, which are associated with a 
very real cost in recall and entry time and increased failure rates—especially on the now widely used 
touchscreens—offer no improvement in security.10  
Fitting the Task to the Human  
The security-centered view assumes that users want to avoid risk and harm altogether. However, many 
users choose to accept some risks in pursuit of goals that are important to them. Security experts assume 
that users who don’t choose the secure option are making a mistake, and thus preventing mistakes and 
educating users are the way forward. 
However, a combination of usability and economics insights leads to a different way of thinking about 
usable security: 
• Usable security starts by recognizing users’ security goals, rather than by imposing security 
experts’ views on users. 
• Usable security acknowledges that users are focused on their primary goals—for example, 
banking, shopping, or social networking. Rather than disrupting these primary tasks and 
creating a huge workload for users, security tasks should cause minimum friction. 
• Security experts must acknowledge and support human capabilities and limitations. Rather 
than trying to “fix the human,” experts should design technology and security mechanisms that 
don’t burden and disrupt users. 
Techniques from the human factors field can maximize performance while ensuring safety and security. 
A key principle is designing technology that fits users’ physical and mental abilities—fitting the task to the 
human. Rarely should we fit the human to the task, because this requires significant organizational 
investment in terms of behavior change through education and training. Security education and training are 
only worthwhile if the behavior fits with primary tasks. An organization could train its employees to 
become memory artists, enabling them to juggle a large number of changing PINs and passwords. But then 
employees would need time for routines and exercises that reinforce memory and recall.  
Changing security policies and implementing mechanisms that enable employees to cope without 
training are more efficient. For instance, Michelle Steves and Mary Theofanos recommend a shift from 
explicit to implicit authentication8; in most environments, there are other ways to recognize legitimate 
users, including device and location information or behavioral biometrics, without disrupting users’ 
workflow. They also point out that infrequent authentication requires different mechanisms that 
complement the workings of human memory—something Adams and I recommended after our first study 
15 years ago2—but this rarely occurs in practice.  
Users will pay attention to reliable and credible indicators of risks they want to avoid. Security mechanisms 
with a high false-positive rate undermine the credibility of security and train users to ignore them. We need 
more accurate detection and better security tools if we are to regain users’ attention and respect, rather than 
scare, trick and bully them into complying with security measures that obstruct human endeavor. 
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